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Abstract 
FDI has been growing at a spectacular pace all over the world and emerging countries have 
been successful in attracting more FDI compared to developed countries. Institutional factors 
are becoming more important as determinants of inward FDI for emerging markets. 
However, research in this area is inadequate and also incosnsistent in terms of findings. In 
this paper, we have examined the institutional determinants of Pakistani FDI inflows and 
also examined the relative importance of those factors. The paper has found that certain 
institutional determinants such as size of the government, legal structure and strong property 
rights, freedom to trade and civil liberty have strong positive effect on FDI inflows. Among 
the institutional variables, regulation has been found to be most important to influence 
inward FDI flow to Pakistan. The paper has also found evidence that there was a structural 
break in FDI flows in Pakistan which coincides with market liberalisation programme in 
early 1990s. This confirms the effectiveness of conducive institutional environment to attract 
foreign investment. Moreover, we have found that military government is more successful 
in attracting FDI compared to democratic government in Pakistan. 
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Institutional Determinants of Inward FDI: Evidence from Pakistan 
1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, the global growth of inward and outward FDI flows has been remarkable 
(Villaverde and Maza, 2015). FDI flows to emerging countries have also increased substantially 
over the same period of time (Xiao and Park, 2018). The concomitant benefits of FDI, ranging 
from the ingress of technological knowledge and management skills, to non-obligatory capital 
flows and increased employment and production capacity, have stimulated this spectacular 
progress of global FDI (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2008). This buoyant global phenomenon has given 
rise to increasing academic research into the determinants of FDI, both inward and outward, 
inspiring much academic debate over the last two decades. Investigations into the determination 
of FDI flows have so far offered better explanations of outward than of inward flows.  
Dunning’s eclectic theory (1980 and 2000), also known as Ownership, Location, and 
Internationalization (OLI) paradigm, offers a comprehensive explanation of FDI activities that 
incorporates ownership, location and the internalization advantages of foreign investment as 
significant stimulants of inward FDI flows. Location advantages specific to a host country render 
it more attractive for FDI than competing countries. However, Kang and Jiang (2012) contend 
that the OLI paradigm places more emphasis on economic efficiency and less on institutional 
legitimacy, which is a crucial consideration for MNCs when they make decisions on direct 
investments in foreign countries.  Similarly, Pajunen (2008) asserts that the OLI paradigm can only 
partially explain locational advantage, recognising the need to consider institutional factors when 
assessing the attractiveness of a country as a destination for foreign investment. Even Dunning 
(2006) adds his support to the argument that institutional factors are important when analysing the 
FDI decision.  
Given the foregoing observations, it is clear that institutional theory has grown in importance in 
exploring the FDI phenomenon, and has a particular relevance to the study of emerging economies 
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(Hoskisson et al., 2000). However, thus far there is a paucity of research linking institutional factors 
and FDI in emerging markets (Bailey, 2018). To address this dearth, our study will examine the 
institutional determinants of FDI inflows of an emerging market. Within this framework, we 
consider institutions as a set of social, political and economic elements, as defined by North (1990), 
and examine how institutions shape the inward FDI decision of foreign investors. These 
institutional elements are of paramount importance for foreign companies making direct 
investments across borders because they collectively influence the success of companies engaging 
in FDI (Scott, 2014). 
We base our investigations of the institutional determinants of inward FDI on Pakistan, where the 
problematical nature of the institutional structure makes it a suitable proxy for other emerging or 
developing markets, where similar institutional and regulatory problems are often found, thus 
creating a template for regulatory policy and practice. Since gaining independence in 1947, the 
institutional environment in Pakistan has remained weak. The country has suffered from perennial 
political instability, high levels of corruption, feeble enforcement of law and order and ineffective 
governance for a protracted period (Shah et al., 2016). Although, since 1988, the government has 
initiated a series of liberalization programmes to attract FDI, these have failed to achieve their 
objectives (Khan, 1997).  The recent flow of foreign investment to Pakistan has decreased 
significantly (Tahir et al., 2015), with inflows declining acutely since 2011. Haq and Zia (2009) 
suggest that this is because of weak institutions. Although several studies have examined Pakistan’s 
FDI inflows (e.g., Azam and Khattak (2009); Hakro and Ghumro, 2011; Hunjra et al. (2013), the 
majority of those have concentrated on general macroeconomic determinants. Focusing solely on 
macroeconomic factors represents a suboptimal solution to the investigation of FDI determinants, 
as macroeconomic conditions are shaped by institutional factors. A weak institutional system can 
reduce cooperation within factor markets and undermine economic restructuring by causing under 
employment, market segmentation and technological exclusion (Caballero and Hammour, 2001). 
Accordingly, we must examine institutional determinants of FDI in addition to macroeconomic 
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factors to help policy makers create an environment supportive of FDI. We note that Shah et al. 
(2016) have applied institutional theory to FDI in Pakistan. However, their study uses a single, 
composite index of institutions rather than looking at their intrinsic components.  
Our study differs from previous investigations in several ways. First, we incorporate a wider range 
of institutional elements to cover social, political and economic institutions, deriving a 
comprehensive model. As Trevino et al. (2008) argue, most studies have predominantly examined 
the influence of market and regulatory institutions, discounting other institutional components, 
even though these have been shown to influence the foreign investment decision (Pajunen, 2008). 
In contrast, our study is based on an examination of integrated institutions, and its findings will 
help policy makers to identify the institutional components that have the greatest impact on FDI. 
Second, we examine the structural break to see if institutional reform in Pakistan, undertaken in 
the early 1990s, has helped to enhance FDI. Third, Pakistan has been afflicted by a volatile political 
situation, continually alternating between democratic and military government, since 
independence. In our study, we examine this important institutional phenomenon and evaluate 
how it has affected FDI inflows during this period. Finally, our study considers the elasticity of 
each institutional factor and assesses its relative importance in determining inward FDI, enabling 
policy makers to focus their endeavours on the most significant determinants of growth.  
Our study derives several important findings. First, institutional factors significantly influence FDI 
in Pakistan. The effect becomes more pronounced during the post liberalisation period compared 
to before, confirming the benefit of market liberalisation during the early 1990s. Another notable 
finding is the positive effect of military governments in attracting foreign investment compared to 
democratic governments. Third, our elasticity tests demonstrate that labour cost, regulations 
governing credit market, labour market and business are the most important institutional factors 
influencing FDI inflows. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two provides a brief overview of FDI 
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in Pakistan. Section three discusses the literature and addresses the main institutional factors 
considered by our study. Section four discusses data and methods. Section five presents the results 
and discussions. Section six details our conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Brief overview of FDI in Pakistan 
The general economic outlook of Pakistan6 is favourable to become a natural destination of foreign 
investment. For example, Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world and placed at 
41st position in terms of projected GDP in 2018 as reported by International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)7. KPMG (2017) reported that Pakistan has been successful in attaining smoother growth 
rate of around 5% for the last five years and has a large labour force (8th largest in the world) to 
support this upsurge in growth.  Wage levels are comparatively lower (ILO) and there are abundant 
natural resources. Baldwin (2016) argues that in an age of globalisation, capital is flowing to 
countries with low labour costs and a higher growth potential. Therefore, with an availability of 
cheap labour and a higher growth rate than developed countries, Pakistan ought to have been 
successful in attracting FDI. Moreover, KPMG (2017) reported that Pakistan has one of the most 
liberal foreign investment regimes in South Asia with an opportunity of 100% foreign equity 
investment in almost all sectors and a fast growing private sector to support foreign investment. 
However, inward investment has not been as good as might have been expected. We present FDI 
inflows in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 shows the relative FDI inflow compared to developed and 
developing markets (including other emerging markets) for various periods from 1970, from which 
it is clear that Pakistan has failed to attract a satisfactory level of FDI compared to China and India. 
For example, in 2012, when emerging markets received more than a fifty percent share of FDI 
inflow globally, Pakistan secured only 0.063 percent of the total, significantly less than emerging 
markets such as China (8.96%) and India (1.89%).  
                                                          
6 Pakistan is classified as an emerging market by the International Monetary Fund. 
7 International Monetary Fund – World Economic Outlook 2018 
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Insert Table 1 here. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the country and sector-wise FDI inflow (% of GDP) in Pakistan, respectively, 
between 2008 and 2016. During this period, foreign investment decreased from 2.18 percent to 
0.85 percent of GDP. Surprisingly, most of the investment was from conventional investors, such 
as the US, UK and UAE. This suggests that Pakistan has been unable to attract investment from 
new countries. Table 3 shows the sectoral distribution of FDI from 2008 to 2016. Data from 
sectoral distribution also provides evidence of poor performance and slow growth in attracting 
FDI. This poor performance can be attributed to various institutional factors. Shah et al. (2016) 
report that Pakistan is positioned lower than one hundredth place in several institutional indexes, 
including law and order, government stability, corruption, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucratic quality. Given such a context, it is important to examine if, and how, these and other 
institutional elements have influenced FDI inflows. Moreover, it is even more important to identify 
which of these institutional variables have had the greatest impact on FDI. Examining these factors 
is of critical importance, since the recent financial crisis has made emerging economies more 
vulnerable, due to their weak and fragile institutional structures (Gevorkyan and Canuto, 2016). 
Insert Table 2 and 3 here. 
3. Literature review 
A nation’s institutional framework comprises political, economic and social elements (North 1990; 
1998; Scott, 1995). These elements form the basis of exchange and production (Sobel, 2002). 
North (1990) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) argue that social, political and economic institutions 
affect the profitability of a firm in a particular country by influencing transaction and 
transformation costs. Therefore, the characteristics of a country’s institutions are important factors 
in attracting foreign investment (Dunning, 2006). Similarly, Delios and Henisz (2000) suggest that 
a country’s institutional setting influences an MNC’s decision to invest. Ghemawat (2001) argues 
that a foreign country can become an attractive investment destination if the distance between 
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host and home country is not great. Applying the CAGE framework, Ghemawat (2001) identifies 
four kinds of distance: cultural, administrative, geographic and economic, arguing that weaker 
institutions in the host country may increase the perceived distance between the latter and the 
home country and therefore depress foreign investment. Institutional integrity plays a more 
important role than explicit trade restrictions and so should be enhanced to make a country more 
attractive as an investment location (Ghemawat, 2001). Similarly, Arregle et al. (2016) note that 
country level institutional approaches facilitated understanding of the location pattern of 
internationalisation. Emphasising the great importance of institutional factors in explaining the 
FDI location decision, Dunning (2006) proposes that future research should consider institutional 
factors as well as the traditional factors proposed in his own OLI theory. 
The institutional environment in emerging markets is different from that in developed markets. 
Khanna and Palepu (2005) identify the absence or under-developed nature of important 
institutional elements in emerging markets. MNCs therefore need to take care when investing in 
emerging markets as institutional weaknesses create more uncertainty, higher business risks and 
increased transaction costs (Rottig, 2016). Kostova and Zaheer (1999) and Scott (2014) stress that 
MNCs must cautiously evaluate institutional factors when selecting an investment location, as this 
is crucial in determining success. Several studies have determined that better institutional quality 
in a host country attracts FDI, as superior institutions reduce investment risk by facilitating the 
process of doing business (Nielsen et al., 2017; Bevan et al., 2004 and Sethi et al., 2003). Bailey 
(2018) argues that institutional factors, such as democratic institutions, political stability, rule of 
law, corruption, tax policies and culture are important factors influencing FDI. He further argues 
that institutional factors are more influential in attracting FDI in emerging countries compared to 
developed countries, and the effect of institutional factors is stronger in emerging countries in Asia 
compared to those in North America and Europe. In this study, we have identified and examined 
several institutional factors that potentially influence the FDI inflows. 
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3.1 Size of Government 
The size of government influences FDI inflow by enhancing its ability to regulate economic 
growth and increase the effectiveness of its public policies. Newton (1982) and Garcia-Sanchez et 
al. (2013) argue that larger government can reflect government effectiveness by providing 
numerous socially desirable services. Pajunen (2008) points out that the FDI decision is 
predominantly influenced by the attractiveness of the host country’s economic growth. 
Government can influence this by providing public goods (Holmes Jr. et al., 2013), building 
infrastructure (Yuan et al., 2010), controlling corruption (Buchanan et al., 2012), providing a sound 
regulatory environment (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002), and ensuring good governance 
(Globerman and Shapior, 2003). Increased size of government, as reflected by increased taxation 
and investment, a higher level of consumption and transfer payments, helps to promote economic 
growth through redistribution of wealth, encouraging foreign investment (Yuan et al. 2010). The 
positive effect of government size on inward FDI may be even more significant in emerging 
countries, where the marginal benefit of government spending is much higher in attracting foreign 
investment by stimulating economic growth. For example, Asimakopoulos and Karsvias (2016) 
find that the majority of emerging and developing countries are still at the upward sloping segment 
of BARS curve, indicating that such countries benefit more from higher government investment 
and expenditure.  
3.2 Property rights and the regulatory framework 
Property rights and regulations are the two most important elements influencing the host country’s 
choice of Global Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) (Bailey, 2018; Choi et al., 2016; Tanaka and 
Iwaisako, 2014; Holmes et al., 2013; Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Pajunen, 2008; Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003). Dunning (1981), applying his OLI framework, postulates 
that property rights and the regulatory environment are two important components affecting the 
decision of MNEs to produce internationally. He further argues that efficient institutions reduce 
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transaction costs, which may arise due to inadequately protected property rights and the absence 
of a properly regulated institutional system. Additionally, a strong regulatory framework reduces 
uncertainty, protecting MNEs and permitting foreign competition by addressing market failure, 
which should increase efficiency and improve profitability (Bailey, 2018; Li and Resnic, 2003). Choi 
et al. (2016) further suggest that the effective rule of law, allied to a stable institutional environment, 
are necessary conditions for a firm to initiate or maintain business. Rammal and Zurbruegg (2006) 
show that a deterioration in the enforcement of investment regulations adversely affects FDI.  
Examining five Asian countries, they find this to be a significant cause of a reduction in FDI.  
Pajunen (2008) argues that support of labour regulations, a sound judicial system, an effective rule 
of law and general justice are important institutional factors encouraging FDI flows. 
3.3 Democracy and political stability 
Pajunen (2008) argues that the political regime and political risk are important institutional factors 
conducive to attracting FDI. Similarly, using data from emerging markets, Holmes Jr. et al. (2013), 
Ahlquist (2006), Asiedu (2006), Globerman and Shapiro (2002) find evidence to support political 
stability as a determinant of FDI. Holmes Jr. et al. (2013) argue that democratic rather than 
autocratic government is more favourable in attracting FDI. Democracy affords managers of 
MNEs the opportunity to influence the system in their favour through interest groups, elections 
and lobbying. Conversely, autocratic government may be seen as a source of instability and 
unpredictability, with power confined to a small number of people.  Studying ninety developing 
countries, Ahlquist (2006) finds that with a more stable government regime and democratic 
political institutions, a country can attract more FDI, particularly from direct investors, who are 
more sensitive to political considerations. However, democracy may create obstacles to favourable 
policy changes because of higher numbers of veto players (Henisz, 2000). Olson (1991) argues that 
autocracy facilitates the implementation of property rights by promoting long-run stability in a 
country, hence attracting foreign investors. Similarly, Asiedu and Lien (2011) mentioned that 
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autocracy provides stability of economic policies as opposed to democracy which involves a 
frequent changes in government officials. Economic Intelligence Unit report (EIU, 2008) has also 
confirmed that autocratic government is more conducive to stable and predictable business 
environment. Haggard (1990) and Greider (1998) argue that FDI favours autocracy because this 
suppresses labour demands, represses protesters and offers tax incentives to MNCs to encourage 
FDI. Li and Resnick (2003) provide supportive evidence for autocracy as a facilitator of FDI, 
which they assert helps MNCs to maintain their monopolistic position in the host market. Asiedu 
and Lien (2011), Busse (2004) and Gani and Al-Abri (2013) also find that autocracy helps to attract 
FDI in host countries. Conversely, democracy can create the threat of terrorism in lower income 
countries (Chenoweth, 2013), which may discourage FDI by causing political instability and 
increasing the cost of doing business (MengYun et al., 2018). 
3.4 Economic policy and market openness 
Theory suggests that the positive effect of economic policies and market openness or liberalisation 
can favourably influence FDI. Ahlquist (2006) examines the effect of economic policy outcomes 
on cross-country capital movements, finding that portfolio investors are sensitive to past 
government behaviour and fiscal policy outcomes. Holmes Jr. et al. (2013) provide evidence of the 
strong influence of economic institutions on FDI in a study of fifty countries. They emphasise the 
role of monetary and fiscal policies and financial market development in attracting FDI. Market 
openness or liberalisation, both trade and financial, are also regarded as important determinants in 
attracting FDI. Okada (2013) finds that the interaction effects of financial openness and 
institutional quality have a positive influence on capital inflows. Reinhardt et al. (2013) demonstrate 
that financially open, less developed economies tend to experience net capital inflow. Aizenman 
and Noy (2006) report a strong feedback effect between trade and FDI in developing countries. 
Similarly, Kim et al. (2013), Medvedev (2012) and Büthe and Minler (2008) further emphasise the 
positive impact of trade liberalisation on FDI inflow. 
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3.5 Political rights and civil rights 
The strength of an individual’s political rights and civil liberties favours the development of human 
capital, increasing the efficiency of FDI inflows (Dutta and Osei-Yeboah, 2013). The latter argue 
that domestic human capital is a strong determinant of foreign direct investment inflows for the 
developing world; yet the contribution of human capital will depend to a great extent on the 
institutional framework of a nation. Political and civil rights are also significant to MNCs’ 
investment decisions. Adam and Filippaios (2007) distinguish between civil and political liberties 
and assert that MNCs tend to invest in countries with strong political liberties. A threshold level 
exists for civil rights, below which repression of civil liberties is associated with greater FDI. Busse 
(2004) also finds that countries with improving rights and liberties receive more FDI per capita 
than would have been predicted on the basis of other country characteristics. An affirmative 
association between these factors is reported in Filippaios et al. (2017), Blanton and Blanton 
(2006), Harms and Ursprung (2002). In their recent work, Filippaios et al. (2017) test the 
hypothesis on a sample of 35,000 investment projects in 110 developing and emerging economies, 
finding a linear relationship between civil liberties and FDI. 
Given the foregoing discussion, we propose that a multinational’s decision on location is governed 
more by an integrated institutional environment than by individual factors. Our study explores the 
role of a range of institutional factors that are expected to determine inward FDI in Pakistan. More 
specifically, our investigation incorporates the size of government, property rights, legal systems, 
access to sound money, freedom of international trade, political and civil rights, the nature of the 
government regime and democracy as influential institutional factors that may influence inward 
FDI flows to Pakistan. 
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4. Methodological issues 
4.1 Institutional quality variable construction8 
The first variable for measuring institutional quality is derived from the Economic Freedom of the 
World-index (EFW), which is widely used and jointly published by the Fraser and The Cato 
Institutes. The EFW is one of the most comprehensive sets of indicators measuring economic 
freedom and institutional quality over the longest time span. The most recent edition includes five 
components constructed from 42 subcomponents available for 150 countries. The index 
comprises five un-weighted average components, reproduced for a country's institutional quality 
with respect to: (i) Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises (SGOV); (ii) Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights (PROR); (iii) Access to Sound Money (SMON); (iv) 
Freedom to International Trade (FTRAD); and (v) Regulations of the Credit market, Labour 
market, and Business (REGUL). The Fraser Institute uses a 0 to 10 scale for each category, 
calculating an average of these five indices to derive an overall index. In this index, zero represents 
the lowest quality of economic institutions and 10 represents the highest level of institutional 
quality. The data of the EFW index is available for every five years from 1970 to 1999 and 
subsequently annually. Our sample begins in 1972 and, hence, we use the given values as the 
average between available samples to fill in the missing observations until 1999. 
Secondary measures that we use in our model are Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL), as 
recommended in Khan (2011), Mhlanga et al. (2010), Busse (2004), and Harms and Ursprung 
(2002) and are taken from Freedom House. Freedom House has published annually comparative 
evaluations of civil liberties and political rights for 14 related and disputed territories and 195 
countries since 1972. They allocate two numerical ratings for each category, based on a scale of 1 
to 7 for each country and territory. Harms and Ursprung (2002) and Mhlanga et al. (2010) use 
                                                          
8 We present a detailed list of factors in Appendix along with the reference to studies that have incorporated those 
variables in their studies when investigating their associations with FDI inflow. 
13 
 
these variables to measure the institutional environment and political instability by taking the sum 
of civil liberties and political rights divided by two [(CL + PR /2)]. In our study, we use PR and 
CL separately to examine their individual impact on inward FDI. 
Our third factor is Polity-IV9 (POLIIV) for measuring democratic governance. Recent theoretical 
and empirical studies (such as Jensen, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003; Jakobsen and Soysa, 2006) 
suggest that, beyond its contribution to property rights, democracy has a notably ambiguous effect 
on FDI inflows. They use Polity-IV (Polity-III in Jensen, 2003) to measure the democracy of the 
host country. 
Finally, we use average labour cost (LCOST) as a control variable, as suggested in Bellak et al. 
(2008), Johnson (2006), Bevan et al. (2004) among others (see Table 1, Bellak et al. (2008) for a 
detailed list of papers that use labour cost). The importance of including labour cost is further 
highlighted in Fontagne and Mayer (2005) who argue that both market-related and cost-related 
factors should be included in an empirical study of FDI flows.  
4.2 Data and sample 
The FDI data for Pakistan is collected from Datastream and updated from various national and 
official sources, such as the Handbook of Statistics published by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) 
and the Board of Investment of Pakistan. Since quarterly data are not available for all the economic 
variables, we have used annual data from 1972-2016, which provides quarterly data. The 
unavailability of quarterly data on Pakistan FDI is also discussed in the ESCAP Statistical 
Yearbook (United Nations Economic and Social Council for Asia and Pacific, 2014) 10. Most of 
the studies on FDI in Pakistan so far use annual data, such as Malik and Malik (2013), Gudaro et 
al. (2012), Danish and Akram (2014), Basnet and Pradhan (2014), and Raza et al. (2015). Our study 
investigates the relationship in a single country setting, and econometrically there is no scaling 
                                                          
9 The data series is obtained from systemicpeace.org. 
10 http://www.unescap.org/resources/statistical-yearbook-asia-and-pacific-2014. 
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problem. Thus, we employ the log value of FDI inflow (FDI) as a dependent variable. 
The descriptive statistics11 show that half of these data are negatively skewed; therefore, there is an 
ARCH (i.e. autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) effect present in these data and most are 
non-normally distributed. For our empirical institutional environment models, we have checked 
the stationarity of the selected variables by testing random walk using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(1979) test. The results indicate that most of the variables are stationary at first-difference but four 
of them are stationary or integrated of order zero (i.e. I(0)) at level, such as FDI (foreign direct 
investment), CL (civil liberties), POLIIV (Polity-IV) and LCOST (average labour cost). Hence, all 
variables have been synchronized based on respective model requirements12. 
4.3 Empirical modelling 
To evaluate the effect of institutional quality on FDI inflow in Pakistan, we adopt three steps. In 
the first step, we measure the relationship using the multivariate OLS model below. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉)𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑁)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿)𝑡−1 + 𝛽4(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑅)𝑡−1 +
 𝛽5(𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷)𝑡−1 + 𝛽6(𝑃𝑅)𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 (𝐶𝐿)𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉)𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 (𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇)𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑡  (i) 
where, FDI is the log of FDI; 𝛽0 is the constant; 𝛽1 to 𝛽9 are the coefficients of each institutional 
and control variable; and 𝜀2𝑡 is the error term. It is well held that an FDI decision may be made 
based on historical data and hence all the independent variables that are supposed to have an effect 
on FDI inflow would manifest their effect from the next period onward (see Anyanwu, 2011). We, 
therefore, apply the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) to select the optimum lag length for our 
model. As a consequence, all the independent variables are lagged by one period. Further, lagging 
the explanatory variables helps to minimize endogeneity problems, as suggested by Neumayer and 
Spess (2005). 
                                                          
11 The descriptive statistics are not reported but are available on request. 
12 All variables are converted to stationary to perform the granger causality test and also to run the VAR model. 
Stationary data has also been used for the regression.  
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In the second step, we estimate three additional models using Equation (i) – to examine the impacts 
of pre-and post-liberalization (and structural break), and the types of ruling government in 
Pakistan. In order to examine the influence of government type, we use a dummy variable, 1, for 
military-led government, and 0 for democratic government. Pakistan has faced three successful 
and three unsuccessful military coups spanning almost thirty-five years (Hayat et al., 2016). 
Moreover, in 2013, for the first time since independence, control of government was peacefully 
transferred from one democratic government to another. Hence, we expect that this variable may 
give us further insight into the influence of institutional quality on FDI inflow. We have checked 
the correlation between this dummy and Polity-IV, which is -11.20%, and is not statistically 
significant. Thus, government types and Polity-IV do not present similar information in our model.  
Further, we apply the Unit Root Test with a Breakpoint (Perron, 1989) to take account of any 
possible structural break in FDI inflow in Pakistan. Perron (1989) points out that structural change 
and unit roots are closely related, so that conventional unit root tests may be biased toward a false 
unit root null when the data are trend stationary with a structural break. Hence, we use a general 
Dickey-Fuller based innovational outlier (IO) test to capture the break dynamics (Perron, 2006). 
For the IO model, we consider the following general null hypothesis: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼 + 𝜓(𝐿)(𝜃𝐷𝑡(𝑇𝑏) + 𝛾𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝑇𝑏) + 𝜖𝑡)     (ii) 
where 𝜖𝑡 are i.i.d. innovations, and 𝜓(𝐿) is a lag polynomial representing the dynamic of the 
stationary and invertible ARMA (Autoregressive moving average) error process. Note that the 
break variable (i.e. 𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝑇𝑏)) enters in the model with the same dynamics as the 𝜖𝑡 innovation. 𝑇𝑏 
is the break date. For alternative hypothesis, we assume a trend stationary model with breaks in 
the intercept and trend: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜓(𝐿)(𝜃𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝑇𝑏) + 𝛾𝐷𝑇𝑡(𝑇𝑏) + 𝜖𝑡)           (iii) 
We apply a general Dickey-Fuller test which nests the two hypotheses with an assumption of non-
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trending data and intercept break as suggested in Perron (1989), and Vogelsang and Perron (1998):  
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜃𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝑇𝑏) + 𝜔𝐷𝑡(𝑇𝑏) + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡𝑘𝑖=1 )    (iv) 
Setting the trend and trend break coefficient 𝛽 and 𝛾 to zero yields a test of a random walk against 
a stationary model with an intercept break. This is sufficient assumption for FDI as it implies, 
there are random shocks with permanent effects amounting to the random walk component (i.e. 
log FDI). In this equation (iv), lag length is selected based on Schwarz Information Criterion and break 
date selection assumption is to minimize the Dickey-Fuller t-statistics. 
In the final step, we apply the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) and the vector autoregression 
(VAR) model of Sim (1980) to check the robustness of the association between FDI inflow and 
institutional quality. By using these methods, we gain a better understanding of the bidirectional 
interrelationship between the variables of our study. For the pairwise Granger causality, we 
consider two series at  and bf,. Our estimate equations are, thus, the following.  
 ∆𝑎𝑡 = 𝜌0 + ∑ 𝜌1𝑖∆𝑎𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜌2𝑖∆𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝜖1𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1  ; and          (v) 
 ∆𝑏𝑡 = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿1𝑖∆𝑏𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿2𝑖∆𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝜖1𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1       (vi) 
We use an F-test for the joint significance of the coefficients, assuming a null hypothesis that at 
does not Granger cause bt and vice versa. In the null hypothesis, we test that the lagged endogenous 
variables of interest (i.e. FDI inflow and institutional quality) do not Granger cause the dependent 
variable of interest (again, either FDI inflow or institutional quality variables). A rejection of the 
null hypothesis shows the presence of Granger causality. 
The VAR model, on the other hand, allows us to analyse the contemporaneous and intertemporal 
linear relationship between the variables. The VAR model used in this study can be expressed as 
follows. 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝐵1𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜑𝑡        (vii) 
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Where, 𝑋𝑡 is a vector that represents endogenous variables – FDI, size of government, sound 
money, regulations, property right, freedom of trade, political right, civil liberties, polity-IV and 
labour cost; 𝑐 is the vector of intercept; 𝐵 is a 𝑡𝑒𝑛 × 𝑡𝑒𝑛 coefficient matrix (for FDI, each 
institutional quality variables and control variable); and 𝜑𝑡 labels the vector of residuals. The 
number of lags (i.e. 𝑘) is estimated based on the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz 
information criterion. When the two criteria indicate different lag lengths, we choose the lesser lag 
length for parsimony. As discussed in the previous section, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) 
test is used to check the non-stationarity of the variables. To clarify the VAR results, we use 
impulse response function, which is sensitive to the ordering of the endogenous variables. 
Therefore, in determining the ordering, we rely on the prior evidence, following Goyenko and 
Ukhov (2009). We order our variables for each model as follows: institutional quality variables, 
control variables, and then the FDI. We put FDI at the end of the VAR ordering in our estimation 
to gain stronger statistical power (Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009). 
 5. Empirical findings 
5.1 Correlation analysis 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 4, providing an approximation of the relationship 
between FDI with other variables in the model. In general, we would expect that all five indicators 
of the institutional environment are positively related to FDI inflows because stronger institutions 
attract foreign investors (Pajunen, 2008). 
Insert Table 4 here. 
The results indicate that five variables, including the control variables (LCOST), are significantly 
associated with FDI inflow in Pakistan. Among them, the highest correlation of FDI is found to 
be with freedom to trade internationally (FTRAD), while the lowest is with regulations (REGUL). 
These indicate that market liberalization is likely to enhance Pakistan’s access to FDI. However, 
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credit, labour or business regulations are not greatly influential. Further, access to sound money 
(SMON) and political rights (PR) are found to be negatively related to FDI. Similarly, the freedom 
to trade internationally and labour cost are negatively related with most of the institutional quality 
variables. Political rights and civil liberties are not very relevant in Pakistan for institutional quality. 
Surprisingly, though, regulations are highly related to the size of government and access to sound 
money. This is to be expected, since a stronger government may impose and maintain better 
governance in an emerging market such as Pakistan’s. Equally, with strong regulations, citizens 
may have better access to sound money.  
5.2 Multi-variate analysis results  
We first investigate whether there is a significant association between institutional quality and FDI 
inflow in Pakistan using multivariate OLS regression as in Equation (i). The Schwarz information 
criterion is used to select the number of lags in our multivariate OLS regression. The residual-
based integration is also tested to check if the model is spurious. Results are reported in Table 5.  
Insert Table 5 here. 
As shown in Table 5, for the overall sample, size of government, regulations, freedom to trade 
internationally, political rights, democracy and the control variable have a significant influence on 
FDI decisions of the MNEs. These findings are consistent with those in Table 4, with some 
exceptions. For instance, SGOV, FTRAD, and POLIIV have positive impacts on the next year’s 
FDI inflow. However, unlike correlation, the current condition of credit market, labour market 
and business regulations have a substantial (which is 0.8591 and significant at 1% level) and 
affirmative impact on the FDI decision. Similarly, the average labour cost is negatively related to 
the following year’s FDI inflow (which is -3.8340 and significant at the 10% level). Political rights 
also become statistically significant. But, surprisingly, the current year index of access to sound 
money is negatively related to FDI inflow in the subsequent year, although insignificantly. 
The summary statistics and residual based diagnostic tests in column two of Table 5 represent the 
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overall fitness of our OLS estimation. The 𝑅2 and 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2 values clearly indicate higher 
explanatory power of independent variables. The significance of F-statistics at the 1% level shows 
the aggregate fitness of our multivariate OLS model. The ADF test and Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
confirm that there are no unit roots in the residuals and there is no serial correlation in our model. 
Similarly, the heteroskedasticity test using ARCH-LM confirms that there is no ARCH effect in 
the residuals. Finally, the Jarque-Bera (1987) test indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
– the residual is normally distributed.         
5.3 Structural break and market liberalization effect 
It is often argued that market liberalization improves institutional quality (Bhattacharyya, 2012) 
and increases FDI inflows in a country (Kim et al., 2013). In line with this argument, we examine 
the dynamic association between institutional quality and FDI inflow during pre- and post-
liberalization episodes in Pakistan. It is expected that in a post-liberalization period, institutions 
should play a more positive role in FDI inflow. In addition, due to change in dynamic 
interrelationship, one could expect a structural shift in FDI inflow around the liberalization date. 
Hence, we investigate this possible shift. We apply the general Dickey-Fuller based innovational 
outlier (IO) test to capture the break dynamics (see, Perron, 2006) using Equations (ii) to (iv). 
Figure 1 displays the test statistics graph (a) and AR specific graph (b).  
Insert Figure 1. 
 
Our unit root based structural test shows that there is a structural break in FDI inflow in Pakistan, 
which occurs in 1991. This indicates that the dynamics of FDI inflow in Pakistan are statistically 
different between pre-and-post 1991. Interestingly, but not unexpectedly, the structural break date 
of FDI inflow also coincides with the market liberalization date in Pakistan (see Bekaert et al., 2003 
for market liberalization date in emerging markets), which indicates that liberalization has 
transformed the interrelationship between the factors under examination. In early 1991, the 
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government announced a far-reaching package of economic reforms intended to stimulate 
economic growth through increased private-sector investment and productivity (Looney, 1997). 
In terms of implementation, the reforms centred upon disinvestment of public enterprise, 
deregulation and denationalization. It could be argued that, despite the difficult domestic economic 
conditions and several changes in government since 1991, Pakistan authorities have shown 
remarkable continuity in their approach to economic policy (Looney, 1997) and attracted a 
relatively higher amount of FDI (Shah et al., 2016). 
To examine the dynamic relationships of FDI inflow with institutional quality before and after the 
structural break (identical to the pre- and-post liberalization period), we estimate the models using 
Equation (i) by dividing the sample into the 1972-1990 period and the 1991-2016 period. Columns 
four to seven in Table 4 present the results of the pre-and post- structural break on FDI inflow. 
The results indicate a significant structural shift in the relationship between institutional quality 
variables and FDI. Specifically, during the pre-liberalization episode the size of government had a 
negative impact on FDI; however, the relationship becomes positive in the post-liberalization 
period. Similarly, civil authorities is insignificant in the pre-break period, but becomes significant 
at the 1% level during the post-break episode. Furthermore, legal structure and security of property 
rights (PROR) and average labour cost (LCOST) are found to be significant only during the post-
structural break period. These results are well in line with the theoretical argument for FDI as 
foreign investors are always looking for cheap labour and an established legal system in a host 
country. Most notably, the variables representing regulations play an important role as a 
determinant of the FDI decision taken by MNEs during both periods. 
5.4 Military versus conventional government in Pakistan 
We re-estimate the regression model using Equation (i) with an additional variable representing 
the type of government (GOVS) - military vs. conventional government system. We take it as a 
control variable for the political factor or political stability; because, in Pakistan, there were two 
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prominent episodes during our study period, when government was led by the military (i.e. from 
1977-1984 and 2000-2007). This variable is considered to be one of the important determinants 
of FDI inflow by many earlier studies, such as those conducted by Lawton et al. (2013), Asiedu 
(2013), Daude and Stein (2007), Khanna and Rivkin (2001), and North (1990). Moreover, we have 
tested the correlation between GOVS and POLIIV. The test result confirms that the two variables 
do not represent similar information. Hence, we incorporate this variable into Equation (i) as 
follows. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑡−1 +
𝛽9 (𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑆)𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑡,   𝑖 = 1,2, … 8           (viii) 
The model considers the possible influence of the current state of government, and hence no lag 
value of GOVS is included in the estimation. The final two columns of Table 5 exhibit the re-
estimated regression model using Equation (viii). The results demonstrate a similar relationship 
between FDI inflows and institutional quality variables to those estimated for the whole sample. 
It is worth noting that once we have incorporated the GOVS variable, average labour cost, i.e. 
LCOST, becomes statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, the type of government generates a 
positive effect, though at a small magnitude at 0.0350. This indicates that a military government in 
power would enhance FDI inflows in Pakistan. 
5.5 Robustness tests 
In this section, we perform a variety of robustness checks for our main findings. We first assess 
the bi-directional causal associations between the variables using the Granger causality test 
(Granger, 1969). Table 6 presents the pairwise Granger causality between FDI inflows in Pakistan 
and its institutional quality as a host country. We use the Schwarz and Akaike information criterion 
for selecting the lag length for our models. 
Insert Table 6 here. 
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In Table 6, Panel A presents the results for the null hypothesis: the lagged endogenous variables 
of interest (i.e. institutional quality) does not Granger cause the dependent variable of interest (i.e. 
FDI inflow); and Panel B presents the results for bidirectional causality between them. The results 
indicate that some of the institutional quality variables significantly Granger cause the FDI inflows 
in Pakistan. In particular, the size of government, regulations, freedom to trade internationally, 
democracy and average labour cost are found significant at the 1 to 5% level. These are consistent 
with most of our findings in Tables 4 and 5. Taken together, we can conclude that institutional 
quality in Pakistan is an important determinant for MNEs when making investment decisions. The 
results further indicate strong bi-directional Granger causality from FDI inflows to regulations and 
labour cost, suggesting that MNEs may possibly influence the regulatory framework and also set 
up the average labour cost in Pakistan. 
To gain further understanding of the dynamic relationship between the FDI decision and 
institutional quality of the host country within the VAR system, we estimate the impulse response 
functions (IRFs).  As discussed in Section 4.3, to preserve strong statistical power as suggested in 
Goyenko and Ukhov (2009), we put our variables in the following order:  institutional quality 
variables, control variables, and finally FDI. Figure 2 displays the accumulated responses of FDI 
inflows to one unit standard deviation innovation in institutional quality shocks, which is traced 
forward over a period of 10 years. Year 0 indicates the contemporaneous impact and Years 1-10 
trace the effect from +1 to +10 years. The responses are measured using standard Cholesky 
decomposition of the VAR residuals. Bootstrap 95 percent confidence bands are provided to 
gauge the statistical significance of the responses. 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
The IRF results show that FDI inflows in Pakistan are positively influenced by the shocks from 
four institutional quality factors. Specifically, the impact of the regulatory framework, i.e. credit 
market, labour market and business, legal structure, security of property rights, and freedom to 
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trade internationally of the host country, have a more pronounced, stronger and longer-lasting 
effect on FDI inflows. These four factors generate a contemporaneous impact and increase FDI 
to 0.5 standard deviation, excluding shocks of property right, which increase FDI inflows by up 
to 10 standard deviations. However, the size of government creates a negative impact in the short 
run (for the first 3 years), but increases the FDI by around 2 standard deviations in the long run 
(in ten years’ time). On the other hand, FDI is negatively sensitive to such factors in the same way 
as civil liberties and average labour cost from year one. These factors reduce FDI inflows by 10 
and 20 standard deviations in ten years’ time, respectively. Further, the shocks from access to 
sound money, political rights and democracy affect the investment decisions of MNEs positively 
in the short-term (up to 3 to 4 periods) and then negatively in the long-term, starting from period 
four to five until the end of the observation periods. The shocks to political rights can reduce FDI 
inflows by 1.5 standard deviations, but the shocks to sound money and POLIIV (democracy) 
remain within 1 standard deviation.  
As we have seen, most of these responses are expected, as they follow theoretical arguments and 
are well in line with our earlier findings, except for those responses to the shocks from civil rights 
and democracy, which are neither pronounced nor strong. The IRFs of these two variables, 
nevertheless, present an interesting characteristic of Pakistan. Together with Table 5, the results 
show that in the short-run the democratic government positively influences FDI inflows, but in 
the long-run it has a negative impact on the investment decisions of MNEs. This evidence suggests 
that democratic government may have been involved in large-scale corruption, abuse of the legal 
system, presenting a threat to civil rights, and patronizing terrorism and may have caused a loss of 
trust from international investors, as suggested in Shah et al. (2016), Hayat et al. (2016), and Tahir 
et al. (2015), hence contributing to the decreasing trend of FDI inflows to Pakistan in the long-
run. 
To observe the response of FDI inflows to a unit standard deviation shock from the military vs. 
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conventional government (i.e. the type of the government in power, GOVS), we further run a 
VAR model. This would help us to gain a better understanding of the relationship between GOVS 
and FDI reported in Table 5; and the IRFs of FDI inflows to POLIIV (i.e. democracy) as reported 
in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the accumulated responses.  
Insert Figure 3 here. 
Surprisingly, the impulse response is positive at the start but becomes flat after the third period. 
This indicates that with the military government in power, FDI inflows take a positive shift up to 
around 0.5 of a standard deviation in the short run. This supports our findings presented in the 
last column of Table 5. The response implies that when international investors lose their trust in 
the democratic government after a while, the military government could possibly show strong 
leadership, creating good economic prospects (see Hayat et al., 2016).  
This result has further motivated us to explore the possible influence of the military government 
on institutional quality in Pakistan. We are incentivised to examine what happens to the 
institutional environment when a military government is in power by means of estimating the 
response of IRFs of institutional factors to the shocks to GOV. Table 7 summarizes the 
accumulated responses. Interestingly, the IRFs indicate that overall institutional quality improves 
after some time when a military government is in power. Further, our control variable, i.e. average 
labour cost, is also positively affected. Therefore, the findings lead us to conclude that the short-
term increase in FDI inflows during the term of a military government is probably due to the 
expectation of better institutional quality. 
Insert Table 7 here. 
5.6 Comparative analysis for policy implication 
In the following analysis, we examine which factors, in particular, a government should emphasise 
when it seeks to boost its FDI and increase economic growth. To this end, we use an elasticity 
weight index (EWI), which allows us to compare all the factors on a homogenous basis. To 
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construct the index, we estimate the elasticity following the procedure suggested by Hiller et al. 
(2011). The elasticity is calculated for each of the institutional and control variables used in various 
regression models. Elasticities are computed below:  
ℎ𝑒 = 𝑛𝑒
?̅?𝑒
𝑛′?̅?
           (ix) 
where, e represents each institutional and control variable; 𝑛𝑒 denotes the coefficient; ?̅?𝑒 is its 
mean; and 𝑛′?̅? is the estimate of the expected value of the dependent variable based on the mean 
value of each regressor. Since the elasticities from the different models cannot be compared 
directly (Hiller et al., 2011), we determine the elasticity weight index (EWI) by measuring the 
respective power (weight) of each independent variable in various models. The index is computed 
below: 
𝐸𝑊𝐼𝑓 =
∑ ℎ𝑒
∑ ℎ
𝑟
          (x) 
where, ℎ𝑒 is the elasticity of each institutional and control variable; ∑ ℎ is the sum of the elasticity 
for the coefficients on all the explanatory variables; and r is the number of models where the 
variables have been used. We do not account for the sign of elasticity in estimation of the index as 
it indicates the direction of the relationship. By using this equation, we capture the weight of 
explanatory power of each institutional and control variable with respect to FDI inflows.  
Therefore, the higher the weight, the greater the contribution a factor will have in influencing FDI 
inflows in Pakistan. The results are reported in Table 8. 
Insert Table 8 here. 
The results clearly show that labour cost has the highest weight (𝐸𝑊𝐼𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 = 4.3321) and thus 
is the most sensitive driver of FDI inflows in Pakistan. Regulation, which comprises credit market, 
labour market and business regulations, appears to be the second most important driver of FDI 
(𝐸𝑊𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿 = 2.8605). Other significant factors include political rights (𝐸𝑊𝐼𝑃𝑅 = 1.2245), 
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size of government (𝐸𝑊𝐼𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 0.9681) and freedom to trade internationally (𝐸𝑊𝐼𝐹𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
0.9370). These results are significant as they provide important policy guidance to the Pakistan 
government. 
5.7 Discussions of the results 
Our results consistently show that general government consumption spending is positively 
associated with FDI inflows in Pakistan. In particular, this variable indicates the extent of 
government involvement in the economy. In effect, more government spending helps to build 
infrastructure, better corporate governance and a skilled workforce through enhanced education 
and training, which is expected to have a positive impact on FDI inflows. In this regard, Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) and Oates (1999) provide comprehensive evidence in respect of this relationship. 
Moreover, based on a survey of global executives, Tarzi (2005) argues that one of the most 
important host country location advantages that would attract FDI is the magnitude of 
government spending. Infrastructural development, in the form of the construction and 
maintenance of roads and bridges, electricity generation and transmission, information and 
communication development, as part of a wider government spending programme, can effectively 
help to attract foreign investment (see Tarzi, 2005). 
Regulation of the credit market, labour market, and business in Pakistan are also found to be 
positive and significant at the various significance levels. Moreover, our elasticity analysis 
demonstrates that this factor should be ascribed the highest weight among all institutional variables 
in explaining the FDI decision-making of MNEs. This indicates that regulations are very important 
in exerting a positive impact on foreign and domestic investors (see, Asiedu, 2013; Daude and 
Stein, 2007; Wei, 2000; Gastanaga et al. 1998). We argue that effective regulatory regimes would 
lead to a more competitive output market and consequently an efficient allocation of goods and 
resources. Wei (2000) points out that poorly regulated institutions, or a complete lack of 
institutional governance, are considered to be a tax on foreign investors. Similarly, Gastanaga et al. 
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(1998) report that corruption and bureaucratic delays, as well as poor enforcement of law and 
order in developing countries, significantly deter the inflow of much needed FDI to support 
economic growth. The rule of law, regulatory quality, the level of corruption, and the enforcement 
of government contracts in recipient countries are significant determinants of the FDI decision, 
as suggested in Asiedu (2013) and Daude and Stein (2007), among many others. 
The third factor, which is found to be strongly positive in most of our regressions, is freedom to 
trade internationally. Moreover, the structural break in FDI inflows in Pakistan coincides with the 
market liberalisation date (see Figure 1). These results indicate that trade openness is an important 
determinant of FDI inflows, as less openness leads to less integration and higher transaction costs 
(see Villaverde and Maza, 2015; Asiedu, 2002). The evidence from Villaverde and Maza (2015) on 
the European regions and the evidence of Asiedu (2002) on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) and non-
SSA countries, support the significant, positive role of trade openness in FDI inflows. In respect 
of other emerging and small markets, Goh et al. (2013) report a positive association between trade 
openness and FDI inflow for Malaysia; Musila and Yiheyis (2015) for Kenya; and Belloumi (2014) 
for Tunisia. 
The final institutional variable, which has a positive role in attracting inward FDI in Pakistan, is 
POLIIV (i.e. democracy), but it has less power to influence the FDI decision of MNEs as reported 
in Table 8. However, in our robustness test, this factor negatively influences FDI inflows after 
three years. This may suggest that democracy helps to attract foreign investment but it does so for 
only two to three years. Increasing corruption, lack of good governance, lack of the rule of law, 
abuse of regulations, and bureaucratic and administrative barriers may have hindered FDI inflows 
after this period in Pakistan (see Shah et al., 2016, Hayat et al., 2016, and Tahir et al., 2015). A 
similar argument is also documented for other developing and developed countries in Asiedu 
(2013), Barthel et al. (2010), Daude and Stein (2007), Wei (2000), and Gastanaga et al. (1998).  
In contrast to the effect of a democratic government, a military government shows a favourable 
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influence on inward FDI in the long run (see Figure 3 and last column in Table 5). Moreover, 
institutional quality also improves during the reign of a military government (see Table 6). This 
implies that foreign investors prefer to make investments in Pakistan when the military are in 
power, which gives rise to better institutional qualities. Furthermore, army government as a form 
of autocracy may have been successful in fighting terrorism in Pakistan and that may have attracted 
FDI.  
Chenoweth (2013) stated that democracy can cause a threat of terrorism in lower income countries 
and Pakistan has been a place of an acute terrorism threat in recent times (Ismail and Amjad, 2014). 
The authors reported that there has been a significant rise of terrorism in Pakistan since 1995 but 
that it started to slow down in 1999. The terrorism threat was at a minimum during the period 
from 1999 to 2008 and started to increase again after 2008. It is pertinent to mention that there 
was military government in Pakistan between 1999 and 2008, led by General Parvez Musharraf. 
This indicates that tougher actions by military government helped to reduce the terrorism threat, 
as stated by Ismail and Amjad (2014). Moreover, Raheem et al. (2014) argue that since the 
independence of Pakistan, government has been subjected to several military coups for more than 
three decades, and, as a result, the authors claim that economic performance and economic stability 
were far better during the time of military rule than under democratic government. In a recent 
study, Hayat et al. (2016) estimate that the average FDI during a period of democratic government 
is reduced by 0.19% more than the average FDI under military rule. They also claim that Pakistan 
consistently enjoyed an economic boom under military regimes. Similar findings are also reported 
in Gani and Al-Abri (2013) for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. 
Further, we find that political rights and average labour cost have negative impacts on inward FDI 
in Pakistan, and both have the significant power to influence the FDI decision by MNEs (see 
Table 8). In fact, the stability of the overall political environment is an important element for 
locational advantage, as argued by Dunning in his OLI paradigm. A stable political environment 
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attracts FDI to the host country. Villaverde and Maza (2015), Naude and Krugell (2007) also point 
out that the political stability of a host country helps to attract FDI. However, an alternative view 
suggests that a weaker political environment can work as an opportunity for foreign investors. In 
this regard, foreign companies can influence a weaker political government to reap economic 
benefits such as tax avoidance and by expediting their own agenda through bribery. Frynas and 
Mellahi (2003) provide evidence that foreign firms benefit from their investments in Nigeria due 
to weak and fragile political systems. Bartels et al. (2014) point out that a poor and corrupt political 
environment can help attract foreign investment. The basic notion of these unconventional 
outcomes lies in the practice of corporate political activities. A weak political environment provides 
the opportunity for foreign firms to engage in local political activities and exploit the system to 
maximize the firms’ benefit (Lawton et al., 2013). Therefore, the relationship between the local 
political environment and FDI inflows may well be negative in emerging countries. Our results 
confirm this fact, and are also in line with the findings of Büsse & Hefeker (2007) and Bussmann 
(2010). 
Finally, the negative impact of average labour cost is documented in Bellak et al. (2008), Johnson 
(2006), Bevan et al. (2004) and many others. Labour cost is frequently considered to be among the 
key economic variables in the discussion of the determinants of investment location decisions of 
firms (see Havlik, 2005). Our results in Table 8 further confirm this notion, and report that labour 
cost has the maximum power to influence the FDI decision by MNEs in Pakistan. This result is 
significant, as it indicates that Pakistan can attract foreign investment as a destination of cheap 
labour, while an increase in average labour cost would significantly reduce FDI inflows. Along this 
line of thought, Bellak et al. (2008) investigate the influence of labour costs on FDI inflows into 
central and eastern European countries and report that both higher unit labour costs and higher 
total labour costs negatively affect FDI. 
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 6. Conclusions and policy implications 
In this study, we examine how the host country’s institutional factors affect FDI inflows into 
Pakistan. Most previous works on inward FDI in Pakistan focus on traditional economic factors: 
very few have examined institutional factors.  In our study, we examine a broader spectrum of 
institutional factors and assess their impact on FDI inflows. We further evaluate the relative 
importance of institutional determinants by way of elasticity tests, which is novel in FDI 
determinant literature. We draw three conclusions. 
First, a sound institutional environment attracts more FDIs into emerging markets such as 
Pakistan’s. In particular, government expenditure and the tax rate, a stronger regulatory framework 
and the freedom to trade internationally, i.e. market liberalisation, have had a positive influence on 
FDI inflows in Pakistan. These results are consistent with the general prediction of institutional 
theory, that greater institutional quality enhances the locational advantage and hence attracts 
greater volumes of foreign investment (Pajunen, 2008). Second, democracy increases the inward 
FDI in the short-run; whereas a military government has a stronger influence on FDI in the long-
run. Further, a stronger political environment has a negative effect on FDI inflows. This finding 
supports the expectation that stringent regulations and a stronger political environment reduce the 
opportunities for cross-border investors to exploit the system to enhance the profitability of their 
ventures. 
The findings of this study have important implications for both academics and policy makers. 
From the academic perspective, this study is an extension of Dunning’s OLI paradigm. We have 
discovered several important institutional factors, such as government size, legal environment, 
trade openness and form of government, that have significant impacts on inward FDI, and confirm 
that these institutional factors influence the locational advantage of a host country such as Pakistan. 
We therefore conclude that the locational advantage of a host country should be evaluated by an 
integrated system of institutional factors alongside the traditional factors such as GDP, market 
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size, interest rate, and inflation. From the viewpoint of policy, our study has provided guidelines 
to policy makers so that they will be able to fashion their policies to attract investment from 
international investors. We conclude that Pakistan should provide enhanced government support 
in the public sector, improve regulatory quality and political stability, along with political and civil 
rights and trade openness, to attract more FDI. Our study demonstrates that the average labour 
cost and the quality of regulations are more important than other institutional factors in gaining 
an immediate momentum in FDI inflow. In the long run, Pakistan should focus on improving its 
overall institutional quality, which can be facilitated by market liberalisation, as demonstrated by 
our findings for the post-structural break period. Further, the positive influence of a military 
government on FDI in the long-run should alert Pakistan’s politicians and policy makers to the 
systematic failure of democracy in providing a sound and stable business environment for the 
business community.  
We finally submit that our study raises issues for future research. This study has used aggregate 
country-level data to analyse the effect of institutions on inward FDI in Pakistan. It would be of 
interest to examine the integrated institutional systems, as in our study, on FDI inflows in a multi-
country setting.  Another possibility would be to use micro-level institutional data to explore the 
potential impacts that they may have on FDI in emerging countries in general. The implications 
for countries in emerging markets having an imperfect institutional culture could usefully be 
investigated using our findings as a foundation. 
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 Appendix: Institutional and Control Variables in the Estimation 
Variable Definition Source and 
incorporated by 
SGOV 
 
 
Size of Government includes: 
General government consumption spending; 
Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
Government enterprises and investment; Top 
marginal tax rate. 
Economic Freedom of the 
World-index (EFW) 
jointly published by 
the Fraser Institute 
and The Cato 
Institute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Haan and Siermann 
(1996); Heckelman & 
Stroup (2000); Haan 
and Sturm (2000); 
Heckelman & Stroup 
(2002); Leschke 
(2000); Pitlik (2008). 
SMON 
 
 
Access to Sound Money includes: 
Money Growth; Standard deviation of inflation; 
Inflation: Most recent year; Freedom to own 
foreign currency bank accounts. Financial market 
development 
REGUL 
 
 
 
 
Credit market regulations (Ownership of banks; 
Foreign bank competition; Private sector credit; 
Interest rate controls/Negative real interest  
rates); Labour market regulations (Mandated cost 
of hiring ; Mandated cost of worker dismissal; 
Conscription) ;  Business Regulations(Price 
controls; Administrative requirements; 
Bureaucracy costs; Starting a business ;Extra 
payments/ Bribes/ Favouritism; Licensing  
restrictions; Cost of tax compliance) 
PROR Legal Structure & Security of Property Rights 
FTRAD 
 
 
Freedom to Trade Internationally includes: 
Taxes on international trade; Regulatory Trade 
Barriers; Size of the trade sector relative to 
expected; Black-market exchange rates; 
International capital market controls.  
PR 
 
Political Rights includes: 
Electoral processes, political participation and 
pluralism, functioning of government and 
discretionary questions 
Freedom House  
 
Kormendi & Meguire 
(1985); Scully (1988); 
Grier & Tullock 
(1989); McMillan, 
Rausser & Johnson 
(1991); Harms and  
Ursprung (2002); 
Busse (2004); Mhlanga 
et al., (2010) 
 
CL 
 
 
 
Civil Liberties includes: 
freedom of expression and belief, associational 
and organisational rights, rule of law and personal 
autonomy and individual right. 
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POLIIV 
 
 
 
 
Polity-IV includes: 
The variable measures the democratic governance 
or political institutions of Pakistan. 
Polity IV project (Centre 
for Global Policy, 
George Mason 
University). 
 
Jensen (2003)  
Li & Resnick (2003), 
Jakobsen and Soysa 
(2006) 
 
LCOST Average labour cost in Pakistan Bevan et al. (2004) 
Johnson (2006) 
Bellak et al. (2008) 
 
GVOS Type of the government includes:  
This variable defines whether the government is 
controlled by Army or elected government. In 
Pakistan, there were two episodes within our 
sample, where government was led by the Army.  
 Lawton et al. (2013), 
Asiedu (2013), Daude 
and Stein (2007), 
Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001). 
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Table 1: Inward FDI Flows (% of total world FDI inflows) 
 1970 1980 1990 1995 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
In Developed economics 71.118 86.142 83.2000 64.760 62.802 49.443 49.652 41.506 46.414 54.698 43.394 59.114 
In Developing economics 28.882 13.815 16.764 34.004 33.803 45.229 44.518 52.025 47.666 40.880 54.620 36.992 
             
Individually:             
China  0.105 1.682 10.922 7.317 8.146 7.507 8.963 8.682 10.063 7.696 7.656 
India  0.341 0.146 0.114 0.626 0.770 1.500 2.191 1.891 1.978 2.708 2.509 2.547 
Pakistan 0.172 0.118 0.134 0.143 0.222 0.144 0.080 0.063 0.093 0.146 0.049 0.115 
Source: UNCTAD 
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Table 2: Country-wise FDI Inflows in Pakistan (% of GDP) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
USA 0.511 0.278 0.134 0.107 0.101 0.092 0.092 0.005 0.025 
UK 0.155 0.175 0.117 0.096 0.282 0.068 0.069 0.056 0.024 
UAE 0.105 0.144 0.160 0.017 0.010 -0.020 0.087 0.040 0.020 
Japan 0.044 0.016 0.002 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.029 0.013 0.016 
Hong Kong 0.092 0.006 0.071 0.038 0.108 0.099 0.056 0.034 0.009 
Switzerland 0.134 0.101 0.062 0.060 0.066 0.091 -0.003 0.021 0.006 
Saudi Arabia -0.054 -0.080 0.004 -0.037 0.001 -0.017 -0.027 0.009 0.001 
Germany 0.045 0.032 0.012 0.013 0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 
Korea (South) 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.003 
Norway 0.059 0.000 -0.027 -0.129 -0.115 -0.009 0.001 0.064 -0.004 
China -0.060 -0.002 0.027 0.059 0.040 0.301 0.131 0.392 0.418 
Others 1.155 0.606 0.356 0.136 0.127 0.110 -0.030 0.218 0.335 
Total 2.187 1.279 0.921 0.384 0.649 0.735 0.404 0.851 0.850 
Source: Board of Investment, Pakistan then converted into % of GDP 
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Table 3: Sector-wise FDI Inflows in Pakistan (% of GDP) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Oil & Gas 0.456 0.440 0.289 0.295 0.249 0.217 0.123 0.092 0.056 
Financial Business 0.416 0.097 0.175 0.030 0.140 0.083 0.105 0.107 0.023 
Textiles 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.000 0.018 0.007 0.005 
Trade 0.098 0.070 0.030 0.012 0.003 -0.001 0.021 0.010 0.011 
Construction 0.055 0.060 0.034 0.034 0.021 0.012 0.022 0.017 0.165 
Power 0.077 -0.072 0.088 -0.040 0.013 0.031 0.115 0.428 0.280 
Chemicals 0.044 0.067 0.017 0.045 0.032 0.041 0.025 0.033 0.004 
Transport 0.055 0.079 0.059 0.009 0.020 0.001 0.003 0.026 0.019 
Communication  0.517 0.173 -0.019 -0.146 -0.172 0.188 0.016 0.091 0.010 
Others 0.449 0.349 0.235 0.132 0.341 0.162 -0.043 0.040 0.277 
Total 2.187 1.279 0.921 0.384 0.649 0.735 0.404 0.851 0.850 
Source: Board of Investment, Pakistan then converted into % of GDP 
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Table 4: Correlation Analysis 
 
FDI 
SGO
V 
SMO
N 
REG
UL 
PRO
R 
FTR
AD PR CL 
POL
IIV 
LCO
ST 
FDI  1.0000 
         
SGO
V  
0.4349
*** 1.0000 
        
SMO
N  
-
0.3269
** 
0.3251
* 1.0000 
       
REG
UL  0.0441 
0.8375
*** 
0.6903
*** 1.0000 
      
PRO
R  0.1895 
0.4046
*** 
0.5560
*** 
0.4726
*** 
1.000
0 
     
FTR
AD  
0.5932
*** 
-
0.2771 
-
0.8874
*** 
-
0.6874
*** 
-
0.363
3** 1.0000 
    
PR  
-
0.1298 
0.2885
* 
-
0.0355 0.1634 
0.091
7 
-
0.1336 1.0000 
   
CL  0.2573 0.2201 
-
0.0867 
-
0.0438 
-
0.050
1 0.1208 
0.3388
** 
1.00
00 
  
POL
IIV  
0.3292
** 
-
0.2033 0.0458 
-
0.2423 
0.038
6 0.2267 
-
0.6754
*** 
-
0.08
62 
1.000
0 
 
LCO
ST  
-
0.3455
** 
-
0.0463 
-
0.6029
*** 
-
0.3531
** 
-
0.395
7** 
0.5951
*** 
-
0.2223 
0.12
74 
0.340
5** 
1.000
0 
Note: This table shows the correlation coefficient between Inward FDI and Institutional 
variables considered in our study.  
***, ** and * explains the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 5: Results of Multivariate OLS Regression 
 
Overall sample 
 
Before structural break 
(pre-liberalization) 
After structural break 
(post-liberalization) 
Types of Government 
 
     
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 9.3360* 1.8966 10.4184 0.4858 1.8830 1.2897 9.1043* 1.8093 
SGOVt-1 0.1931* 1.7703 -0.6117** -2.2056 0.3777*** 4.4634 0.2120** 2.1835 
SMONt-1 -0.1696 -0.6801 -0.4022 -1.4758 -0.0506 -0.7332 -0.1920 -0.7368 
REGULt-1 0.8591*** 3.3551 1.0028*** 3.7663 0.9821*** 7.6532 0.8667*** 3.3282 
PRORt-1 0.0151 0.0925 0.0230 0.1391 0.0939*** 3.0982 0.0411 0.2267 
FTRADt-1 0.3485*** 3.3923 0.5788*** 3.8926 0.3443*** 7.7181 0.3343*** 2.9954 
PRt-1 -0.4678*** -4.3868 0.4217*** 3.7974 -0.0231 -0.5699 -0.4534*** -3.9244 
CLt-1 0.0938 0.3303 0.4075 1.2761 0.8585*** 4.8242 0.1093 0.3754 
POLIIVt-1 0.1370*** 15.9280 0.1337*** 15.2152 0.0151 1.5478 0.1374*** 15.6426 
LCOSTt-1 -3.8340* -1.7227 -3.8731 -0.3644 -1.0456** -2.2978 -3.6391 -1.5672 
GOVS 
      
0.0305 0.3538 
         
R-squared 0.9237 
 
0.9335 
 
0.9360 
 
0.9240 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9029 
 
0.9122 
 
0.9000 
 
0.9003 
 
Log likelihood -43.1321 
 
-37.4429 
 
23.3752 
 
-43.0481 
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F-statistic 44.4144*** 
 
43.6889*** 
 
25.9922*** 
 
38.9258*** 
 
         
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test 
2.1796 
(0.1301)  
1.004 
(0.3801)  
0.3713 
(0.6964)  
1.9707 
(0.1576)  
Heteroskedasticity test 
1.4657 
(0.2016)  
1.1568 
(0.3589)  
0.8079 
(0.6161)  
1.2356 
(0.3081)  
Jarque-Bera test 
2.8212 
(0.2440)  
1.6063 
(0.4479)  
0.5456 
(0.7612)  
2.7118 
(0.2577)  
         
Unit-root in residuals (-4.7025)***  (-3.9723)***  (-5.0167)***  (-4.6744)***  
Note: This table represents four multivariate OLS regression results, the first one is for overall sample period. The before and after structural break models are estimated based on 
the date found in structural break test, which is 1991. Therefore, samples have been divided between 1972-1990 and 1991-2016 to run the models. The structural break date of FDI 
is also coincide with the market liberalization date in Pakistan (see Bekaert et al. (2003) for market liberalization date). Hence, OLS results in column four and six also display the pre-
and post-liberalization effect on FDI inflow. Final two columns of this table show the regression results with an additional variable for type of the government. In fact, we consider 
it as a control variable for political factor or political stability. Because in Pakistan, there were two prominent episodes within our sample, where government was led by the Army (i.e. 
from 1977-1984 and 2000-2007). Therefore, we have tested whether it has any impact on the Inward FDI flows along with Polity IV. The factor is considered as one of the important 
determinant for FDI inflow by Lawton et al. (2013), Asiedu (2013), Daude and Stein (2007), Khanna and Rivkin (2001), and North (1990). We also have checked the stationarity of 
residuals for each model and the null hypothesis was rejected in all four. That means there is no unit root in residuals and regression is not spurious. Hence, the model successfully 
eliminates the stochastic trends to produce stationary residuals, which indicates possible cointegration among the variables based on Engle-Granger (1987) residual based approach. 
Model’s fitness and diagnostic tests results are reported at the bottom of the table. t-statistics for diagnostic tests are reported in bracket. 
***, ** and * explains the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Figure 1: Structural Break Test  
 
(a) Test statistics graph 
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Table 6: Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
 Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
   
Panel A: The institutional quality variable does not Granger Cause FDI 
   
 SGOV  6.28361*** 0.0046 
 SMON  0.30643 0.7380 
 REGUL  4.06861** 0.0255 
 PROR  2.09352 0.1380 
 FTRAD  6.54580*** 0.0038 
 PR  1.04632 0.3611 
 CL  0.58536 0.5618 
 POLIIV  14.0435*** 3.E-05 
 LCOST  3.81603** 0.0334 
   
Panel B: FDI does not Granger Cause the institutional quality variable 
   
SGOV 0.62950 0.5386 
SMON 0.84504 0.4379 
REGUL 2.39008* 0.1060 
PROR 0.81367 0.4512 
FTRAD 0.59420 0.5573 
PR 2.18474 0.1264 
CL 0.02089 0.9793 
POLIIV 1.48186 0.2400 
LCOST 2.66093* 0.0863 
***, ** and * explains the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
49 
 
Figure 2: VAR-based Impulse Responses to Institutional Quality 
Each graph represents accumulated response of FDI to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E of institutional quality 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to PR
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to POLIIV
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to SMON
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to SGOV 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to REGUL
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to FTRAD
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to PROR
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of POLI4 to FDI to LCOST
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of FDI to CL
 
50 
 
Figure 3: VAR-based Impulse Responses to the Type of Government 
The graph represents accumulated response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E. 
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Table 7: Summary of Impulse Responses to the Type of Government Shocks 
 Accumulated response to GOVS 
 Response Significance 
SGOV + Sig 
SMON + Sig 
REGUL + Sig 
PROR + Sig 
FTRAD - Sig 
PR + NSig 
CL + NSig 
POLIIV - NSig 
LCOST + Sig 
Note: + and – are positive and negative responses of institutional quality variables to a unit 
standard deviation innovation in the type of government (GOVS). Third column shows 
whether the response sign presented in column two is significant (i.e. Sig) or non-significant 
(i.e. NSig) based on the Bootstrap 95 percent confidence bands.   
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Table 8: Factor Elasticity and EWI 
Variable    (1)    (2)    (3)      (4)       EWI 
      
SGOVt-1 
0.1340 -0.4379 0.2573 -0.1471 0.9681 
SMONt-1 
-0.1305 -0.3316 -0.0354 -0.1478 0.8055 
REGULt-1 
0.5621 0.6879 0.6113 0.5670 2.8605 
PRORt-1 
0.0056 0.0091 0.0359 0.0153 0.0595 
FTRADt-1 
0.1812 0.2586 0.2054 0.1738 0.9370 
PRt-1 
0.2758 0.2580 -0.0119 0.2673 1.2245 
CLt-1 
0.0561 0.2467 0.4754 0.0654 0.5818 
POLIIVt-1 
-0.0086 -0.0238 0.0051 -0.0087 0.0534 
LCOSTt-1 
-0.9566 -0.9694 -0.2387 -0.9080 4.3321 
GOVS    0.0023 0.0185 
Note: The table presents elasticity parameter estimates from OLS regression of FDI on 
institutional and control variables under several different specifications used in Table 5. 
Thus 1, 2, 3 and 4 are respectively overall sample, pre and post liberalization and types of 
government models. The interpretation for each coefficient is the change in FDI 
associated with a one-unit change in the determinant and sign shows the direction of the 
association. EWI is the elasticity weight index, which is average weight of each factor’s 
elasticity in all four models.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
